Solidarity Fund
Impact Framework
To help the board and management make strategic decisions about what will (and will not) be supported by the Fund*

To provide clarity on how the Fund measures its success, and guidance to implementing partners on what data should be collected

To support a powerful narrative of what the Fund is trying to accomplish, and how it is going about doing so

To strengthen background documentation that may be necessary for audit purposes

* This Impact Framework is considered a “living document” that will be consistently reviewed to determine if the Fund should change course, tactics, etc. as the pandemic evolves
Solidarity Fund Guiding Principles

The Solidary Fund will provide funding and support for...

- Interventions that are **catalytic and complement, enhance or augment** those provided by the state (where the state has limited capacity to undertake the interventions)
- **Gap funding** that **accelerates** the delivery of critical interventions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and in deploying funding, where possible, catalyse and support local manufacture and SMMEs
- **Addressing a specific challenge** that exists as a **direct result of COVID-19**, or is an existing challenge that is severely exacerbated by the crisis
- Interventions by **non-state actors in response to the COVID-19 crisis**, that are delivered at **scale** relative to the challenge, in areas the SF has prioritised
- Interventions that **enable and support coordinated responses** across social partners to accelerate **scalable and sustainable solutions** to humanitarian challenges exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and related economic disruption

The Solidary Fund will **not** provide funding for...

- Interventions for segments of the populations that do not need support (i.e. those that are healthy, wealthy and safe)
- Interventions that **existing government (or other substantial private) programmes are already sufficiently addressing** (e.g. UIF, DSBD)
- For now, funding of employment, including SMME funding or individual salary replacement
- **Unsolicited Funding Applications** from NPOs or companies to support their operations and/or programmes that are not specifically required by SF to deliver on our agreed strategic interventions and deployments
- **Large items** that will take up such a significant portion of the Fund’s budget that it would be unable to fulfill its other objectives
Although substantial in size, the Fund is a relatively small component of South Africa’s overall response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Fund seeks to **contribute towards and strengthen** this broader response, as depicted below.

Strengthening **prevention, detection, care, and support** for those affected by the crisis are the best points of leverage for the Fund. The choice of these pillars is based on best available evidence about the disease and its effects, positing that:

- “Flattening the curve” through prevention measures will lower infection rates;
- Detecting and understanding the magnitude of the disease is necessary to contain it;
- South Africa’s healthcare system requires support to provide adequate care now and in the event of future waves of the disease; and
- Vulnerable people and families in South Africa need additional support to weather the social and economic consequences of the pandemic.

The Fund is operating in a **volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous environment**. Its strategy and implementation is informed by the best available evidence, which is also quickly evolving. The Fund seeks to act as rapidly as possible to meet urgent needs, acknowledging that our information and knowledge about “what works” is imperfect.

The Fund recognises that it will be challenging (if not impossible) to directly attribute impact at a national level to its activities. Instead, **the impact framework focuses on the contribution of the Fund to the overall response**, and therefore distinguishes between outputs that can be directly measured, the predicted impact of these outputs and national-level indicators.

With that being said, the Fund will **broadly measure its success in terms of additionality to the COVID-19 response**. All of the activities we fund are supported with the belief that the Fund is uniquely placed to respond more rapidly at scale than other stakeholders and reach some of the most vulnerable, remote communities when others cannot.

...target specific leverage points that can make an outsized contribution towards strengthening South Africa’s ability to respond to the pandemic...
The Solidarity Fund’s Impact Statement is:
To effectively and meaningfully contribute to South Africa’s ability to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic

This impact will be accomplished through four pillars of activity:

Prevent  Detect  Care  Support

These activities are described in more detail in the following slides, beginning with a comprehensive Theory of Change, which outlines the desired causal chain that the Solidarity Fund hopes to see through its support.
Theory of Change
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cross-cutting themes</th>
<th>Pillars</th>
<th>Activities supported by the Fund</th>
<th>Expected short- to medium-term outcomes</th>
<th>Impact Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Prevent</strong></td>
<td>If we support powerful, accurate and widespread COVID-19 communication and awareness campaigns, aligned with national health information and specifically focused on low-income households and communities...</td>
<td>...then people will better understand the disease and its implications...</td>
<td>1. The Fund will have effectively and meaningfully contributed to South Africa’s ability to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic...</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Detect</strong></td>
<td>If we accelerate and expand the availability of sufficient testing across the country...</td>
<td>...then we will be able to test more and as many people as possible...</td>
<td>2. ...and lower infection rates of COVID-19 across the country...</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Care</strong></td>
<td>If we ensure effective and widespread contact tracing and follow-up...</td>
<td>...then we will be able to isolate and self-quarantine those where needed...</td>
<td>3. ...and promote national/social solidarity...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Support</strong></td>
<td>If we build a better understanding of the pandemic through data, research and intelligence-gathering activities...</td>
<td>...then the country will have a stronger evidence-base upon which to design and drive interventions...</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If we accelerate procurement of the necessary emergency PPE and essential medical equipment...</td>
<td>...then there will be adequate equipment for community and professional healthcare workers...</td>
<td>4. ...and allow for effective action to be coordinated at a national level...</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>If we bolster capacity by increasing availability and utilisation of ICU and high-care beds, as well as isolation facilities...</td>
<td>...then we will strengthen and maintain healthcare facilities’ ability to cope with an increased number of patients...</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If we support community and professional healthcare workers across the country...</td>
<td>...then we will have a resilient workforce ready to fight the disease...</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If we provide emergency food relief for newly vulnerable households due to the pandemic...</td>
<td>...then we will reduce rates of undernutrition and starvation for the most vulnerable...</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If we ensure access to basic health and hygiene supplies for newly vulnerable households due to the pandemic...</td>
<td>...then we will protect the health and safety of the most vulnerable...</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>If we care for and support victims of gender-based violence...</td>
<td>...then we will strengthen the short-term, emergency ‘safety net’ for South Africa’s most vulnerable...</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>...and bolster their ability to ‘weather the storm’ created by the pandemic...</td>
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</table>
How the Solidarity Fund measures its success

The Fund envisions a two-tiered approach to measurement, utilizing both national-level and activity-level data to track progress.

### COVID-19 NATIONAL INDICATORS

- # people infected with COVID-19
- # people infected with COVID-19 per 100,000
- % compound daily growth rate of COVID-19 (10-day average)
- # daily/total tests carried out for COVID-19 (10-day average)
- # of deaths per confirmed infections

The Fund monitors a limited number of national level indicators, as tracking this data is essential to inform any changes to the Fund's strategic direction and tactics. However, the Fund is also clear – as per its critical underlying assumptions – that it is not possible to directly attribute its efforts to this macro-level data.

### Quantitative Focus

- # of COVID-19-related communication campaigns (through newspapers, magazines, social media, TV, radio, etc.)
- Reach of COVID-19-related communication campaigns

- # of testing kits purchased
- # of tests completed (including location data)*

- # of PPE/essential medical equipment purchased
- # of PPE/essential medical equipment delivered (incl. location data)
- # of healthcare workers provided with PPE*

- # of food parcels delivered (incl. location data)*
- # of households provided with basic health and hygiene supplies (incl. location data)*
- # of people accessing GBV support services (incl. location data)

### Qualitative Focus

- How has the SF been able to contribute to the “public narrative” about the pandemic and its implications?
- How has the SF been able to accelerate and expand the country’s ability to ramp up testing?
- How has the SF been able to augment and “close the gap” in terms of the country’s existing healthcare capacity?
- How has the SF been able to provide “rapid response” support to the crisis as it unfolds? (NB: developing a “rapid response needs assessment tool” is critical)

For these indicators, it should be possible to measure the Fund’s contribution as a % of the national response.

Qualitative data will focus on the “story” that the Fund will use to measure its success for each pillar.

* For these indicators, it should be possible to measure the Fund’s contribution as a % of the national response.
Solidarity Fund impact risks (1/5)

For each of the Fund’s Pillars, a number of impact risks have been identified. These have been ranked based on severity and likelihood based on the matrix to the right. The risks and mitigation strategies are discussed in more detail on the following slides.

### Risks and mitigation: Solidarity Fund (overarching)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Mitigation strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The Theory of Change is based on the underlying assumption that if the Solidarity Fund (SF) makes resources available, those resources can and will be used effectively. This is a risk if the Fund overestimates the capacity of the service providers and recipients (e.g. various branches of government, for-profit companies, non-profit organisations, community-based organisations). | 5        | 3          | 15     | • The SF conducts appropriate due diligence (within South Africa’s specific context) on partners to identify those organisations most suited to deliver on required activities.  
• The SF maintains close reporting relationships with all contracted partners to reduce the likelihood that they are unable to make use of resources (and/or identify when they are behind schedule on deliverables).  
• The SF has a clear monitoring framework to support follow-up, tracking and assessment of outcomes as far as practical or possible. |
| Good will towards the Solidarity Fund (aligned with the spirit of unity and supporting others) is critical to its success. Potential risks include that the SF will lose support from the public if it is perceived to be ineffective or corrupt; and/or that people will communicate things in the SF's name or falsely claim association with the SF while not aligning with the values of the SF. | 5        | 3          | 15     | * The SF will make every effort to communicate transparently, frequently and effectively to the general public, as a necessary step to ensure that the SF continues to receive donations and that its efforts (and reports on those efforts) are accepted in good faith.  
* The SF will monitor media coverage for any alerts to possible corruption and perceived corruption (by people associated with or claiming to be associated with the SF) and respond swiftly as appropriate. |
### Risks and mitigation: Prevent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Mitigation strategies</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Although the Fund can track the number and reach of communication</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>• Given the expense associated with in-depth tracking of communication campaign impact, the SF has determined that tracking reach is adequate indicator of success.</td>
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<td>campaigns, it is very difficult to measure the specific impact of</td>
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<tr>
<td>these campaigns on consumers of the information and therefore the</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>risk is that these campaigns may be inefficient and/or ineffective.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Awareness does not necessarily lead to behaviour change. In addition,</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>• The SF cannot control human behaviour, and recognises that its contribution is one part of an overall effort to promote healthy behaviour.</td>
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<tr>
<td>social challenges (e.g. hunger, poverty) contribute towards non-adherence. In general, individuals may not be entirely rational when it comes to weighing the consequences of personal health decisions; they tend to make errors in judgment and do not always know how to appropriately apply available information and therefore the risk is that these campaigns may be inefficient and/or ineffective.</td>
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### Risks and mitigation: Detect

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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| Although the SF can track the number of testing kits/materials delivered (including location data), the SF will not be able to determine if results of tests were delivered timeously and/or if the appropriate isolation/self-quarantine measures were implemented as necessary. | 2        | 3          | 6      | • The SF includes specific reporting requirements in all agreements to track the purchase and delivery of all testing kits/materials (as well as testing data, where available)  
• When substantial risks are flagged through monitoring activities, the SF will conduct "spot check" interviews (through third party service providers) with end users/recipients, where appropriate and feasible  
• The SF publicly reports on selected partner organisations, including mapping data showing where all distributions have taken place (when and where available) |
| Contact tracing may not be implemented effectively.                 | 2        | 4          | 8      | • The SF will remain transparent about supporting NDOH efforts and guidelines in terms of best practice for contact tracing  
• When substantial risks are flagged through monitoring activities, the SF will conduct "spot check" interviews (through third party service providers) with end users/recipients, where appropriate and feasible |
| **NB: The SF is not yet supporting any specific activities related to contact tracing, but this may change** |          |            |        |                                                                                                                                                    |
| Methods of contact tracing may raise privacy concerns and garner backlash against increased surveillance. | 3        | 2          | 6      | • The SF will remain transparent about supporting NDOH efforts and guidelines in terms of best practice for contact tracing |
| **NB: The SF is not yet supporting any specific activities related to contact tracing, but this may change** |          |            |        |                                                                                                                                                    |
## Solidarity Fund impact risks (4/5)

### Risks and mitigation: Care

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Mitigation strategies</th>
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</table>
| Although the SF can track numbers of PPE/essential medical equipment delivered (including location data), the SF cannot track usage of these materials in most cases. | 2        | 4          | 8      | - The SF includes specific reporting requirements in all agreements to track the purchase and delivery of all testing kits/materials (as well as testing data, where available)  
- The SF will engage with NDOH on any usage data available (via EY)  
- When substantial risks are flagged through monitoring activities, the SF will conduct “spot check” interviews (through third party service providers) with end users/recipient, where appropriate and feasible |
| Perceived/actual corruption and/or misappropriation at points of procurement and distribution may lead to equipment not reaching its destination as quickly as possible. | 4        | 3          | 12     | - The SF conducts appropriate due diligence and institutes clear monitoring requirements for all selected partners, including regular (e.g. daily, weekly) reports on the movement of goods (these reports include photo/video evidence where possible)  
- The SF publicly reports on selected partner organisations, including mapping data showing where all distributions have taken place (when and where available)  
- The SF retains the right to audit activities of partners as per signed agreements, and will exercise this right where necessary and feasible  
- When substantial risks are flagged through monitoring activities, the SF will conduct “spot check” interviews (through third party service providers) with end users/recipient, where appropriate and feasible  
- The SF will monitor media coverage for any alerts to possible corruption and perceived corruption (by people associated with or claiming to be associated with the SF) and respond swiftly as appropriate |
| The quality of PPE/essential medical equipment that the SF procures may be determined to be poor and/or inadequate upon delivery. | 5        | 2          | 10     | - The SF and its partners conducts thorough due diligence when procuring all PPE/essential medical equipment, and is guided by NDOH criteria and guidelines in this regard |
| The health system is already starting at a point of not being able to effectively provide care equitably, so there are additional barriers to overcome for adequate care to be provided for all COVID-19 patients. | 5        | 4          | 20     | - As far as possible, the SF will prioritise support for health activities (e.g. CHW support) in vulnerable communities where the need is greatest  
- The SF will closely monitor selected COVID-19 health metrics (e.g., infection rate, daily growth, number of deaths) to track of levels of care and inform disbursement decisions |
## Risks and mitigation: Support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Mitigation strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The supply of food parcels or other basic supplies and support services to selected families or organisations risks fomenting dissent and even violence in communities. This threatens the safety of distributors and community members. | 5        | 3          | 15     | • In selecting partner organisations, the SF tries to be as inclusive as possible (e.g. taking into account geography, faith, local networks, etc.)  
  • The SF relies on selected partner organisations to understand local dynamics “on the ground”, identify the most vulnerable beneficiaries and be transparent about selection and distribution  
  • For all distributions, the SF makes every effort to engage and coordinate with local structures (e.g. SAPS, provincial/local government, traditional authorities) to ensure safety and security and to promote healthy communication with the community |
| Signed registers that food or other basic supplies have been delivered do not indicate how long these last or how many people they provided for. | 3        | 1          | 3      | • The SF determines the contents of food or other parcels it distributes based on best practice and, where applicable, government standards  
  • This allows the SF to make well-informed assumptions about how many people can be supported through the parcel, and for how long  
  • Where appropriate and feasible, the SF will conduct “spot check” interviews (through third party service providers) with end users/recipients |
| Perceived/actual corruption and/or misappropriation of food parcels and basic health and hygiene supplies at any point in the procurement or distribution chain may lead to supplies not reaching the most vulnerable households | 4        | 2          | 8      | • The SF conducts appropriate due diligence and institutes clear monitoring requirements for all selected partners, including regular (e.g. daily, weekly) reports on the movement of goods (these reports include photo/video evidence where possible) and signed registers for all beneficiaries (including name, address, contact details and ID number [where applicable])  
  • The SF publicly reports on selected partner organisations, including mapping data showing where all distributions have taken place (when and where available)  
  • The SF will monitor media coverage for any alerts to possible corruption and perceived corruption (by people associated with or claiming to be associated with the SF) and respond swiftly as appropriate |
| Gender-based Violence (GBV) interventions might not be appropriate for or accessible to the most vulnerable in our society (e.g. reliant on data, proximity to urban centres). | 3        | 2          | 6      | • The SF will work in partnership with trusted organisations and networks in the GBV sector to inform and implement its approach |